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THE LOOMING BATTLE FOR
CONTROL OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Andrew D. Bradt*
INTRODUCTION
2018 marks fifty years since the passage of the Multidistrict Litigation Act.
But instead of thoughts of a golden-anniversary celebration, an old Rodney
Dangerfield one-liner comes to mind: “[M]y last birthday cake looked like
a prairie fire.”1 Indeed, after a long period of relative obscurity, multidistrict
litigation (MDL) has become a subject of major controversy—and not only
among scholars of procedure.2 For a long time, both within and beyond the
rarified world of procedure scholars, MDL was perceived as the more
technical, less extreme cousin of the class action, which attracted most of the
controversy.3
But as class actions have receded, at least in mass-tort cases, MDL has
stepped into the spotlight.4 The attention is in part due to sheer numbers—

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. The author wishes to thank
those whose insights and suggestions have improved this Article, including all of the
participants in the Symposium and Bob Berring, Zach Clopton, Dan Farber, Teddy Rave, and
Susannah Tobin. This Article was prepared for the Fordham Law Review Symposium entitled
Civil Litigation Reform in the Trump Era: Threats and Opportunities, held at Fordham
University School of Law on February 23, 2018.
1. Tom Shales, Rodney Dangerfield Gets Respect, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 1979),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1979/08/28/rodney-dangerfield-getsrespect/ecaf3fc9-4299-49f8-b008-91409be7ca94/ [https://perma.cc/99U6-YSPG].
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 71, 73 (2015) (describing the importance of steering committees); Howard M. Erichson,
Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective
Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 541.
3. Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 47
(1991) (describing MDL as a “‘sleeper’—having enormous effect on the world of
contemporary litigation but attracting relatively few critical comments”); see also Margaret S.
Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 EMORY L.J.
1339, 1350 (2014) (noting that “MDL . . . remains one of the least studied types of federal
litigation”).
4. Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 793–
94 (2010); see also Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate
Litigation: A Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 296 (2014) (describing U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence limiting availability of class actions).
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39 percent of the pending federal civil docket is in MDL.5 But it is also
because MDL is now the arena in which many issues of major public concern
are playing out6—and typically being settled.7 Examples include the
Volkswagen clean diesel scandal,8 the National Football League concussion
litigation,9 the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,10 and, now, the opioid-addiction
crisis, which has thrust MDL into the public consciousness.11 Due to both
the scope of the opioid epidemic and the aggressive posture of the judge in
charge, explanations of what MDL is, how it works, and what it does have
now made their way into the pages of major newspapers and onto the screens
of major websites. This shift is an odd development for those of us who once
struggled to explain concepts like the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (JPML) and limited transfer for pretrial proceedings to our
nonproceduralist colleagues and now find ourselves discussing these topics
with reporters.12
Even before opioids, MDL’s dominance had begun to garner plaudits—
indeed, as Professor Coffee puts it, “the most successful step taken in the
administration of aggregate litigation in the United States was the creation of
the JPML in 1968.”13 But with this success has come scrutiny; as MDL has
grown ever more prominent, it has also attracted the attention of not just
scholars, but lawmakers. Today’s MDL framework is effectively the same
as when it was enacted by Congress in 1968,14 but that may not be the case

5. Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2017)
(noting that this is “a number that tends to shock even those law professors who teach
procedure”).
6. Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action,
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846, 850 (2017) (noting the “stunning growth” in MDL, especially in highprofile cases).
7. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) (describing MDL’s facility in coordinating global settlement).
8. See generally Wyoming v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. (In re Volkswagen Clean
Diesel Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.), 264 F. Supp. 3d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
9. See generally In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307
F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d, 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016).
10. See generally In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” on April 20, 2010,
21 F. Supp. 3d 657 (E.D. La. 2014); Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil
Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397 (2014).
11. See generally In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L.
2017).
12. See, e.g., Christa Case Bryant & Henry Gass, An Unprecedented Effort to Stem Opioid
Crisis—and the Judge Behind It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 9, 2018),
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2018/0509/An-unprecedented-effort-to-stemopioid-crisis-and-the-judge-behind-it [https://perma.cc/X3EQ-YKU5]; Abbe R. Gluck,
Opinion, Can a Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2018, 6:24 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-a-judge-solve-the-opioid-crisis-1525731873
[https://perma.cc/S7CX-7QEY].
13. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 155
(2015).
14. 90 CONG. REC. 4927–28 (1968) (noting the passage of the bill on the consent
calendar).
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forever.15 Last year, the House introduced a bill backed exclusively by
Republicans, the Fairness in Class Actions Litigation Act (FICALA), which
included a lengthy set of new provisions to “reform” multidistrict litigation.16
The bill was passed on party lines in the House—without hearings—and
currently languishes in the Senate.17 But the extensive MDL provisions in
the bill demonstrate that the interests of corporate defendants hew toward
significant changes to MDL procedure, which they believe is currently rife
with abuse by plaintiffs and overreach by imperialistic judges.18 Although
current prospects for FICALA’s passage are uncertain in the Senate,19 those
behind the legislation are also now pursuing reform through a different
avenue: the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (“Rules Committee”). In
late 2017, numerous proposals, many of which are similar or identical to
those in FICALA, were presented for consideration to the Rules Committee,
which caused the chair to appoint a subcommittee to investigate whether
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for MDL should be considered.20 This
would be a striking change as these rules would be the first ever directed to
MDL.
MDLs have always been thought to be adequately governed by the plain
old Federal Rules. Indeed, in what today seems like a redundancy, the MDL
statute provides that the JPML may not create rules for MDL that are
inconsistent with the Federal Rules.21 Currently, however, proponents of
FICALA and the Federal Rules for MDL, most notably the advocacy group
Lawyers for Civil Justice,22 take the position that the typical rules are
inadequate. Rather, they perceive MDL judges as effectively unbound by
procedural doctrine—operating in something like the Outback Steakhouse of
litigation: “No Rules, Just Right.” In their view, these judges see themselves
as “cowboys” with a roving commission to resolve and settle major national
crises by whatever means necessary, often making it up as they go along.23
Once an MDL gets going, they believe judges use the effectively limitless

15. See Andrew D. Bradt, The Stickiness of Multidistrict Litigation, 37 REV. LITIG.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 18–20) (on file with author).
16. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105 (2017); Press Release, Rep. Goodlatte, Goodlatte
Introduces Major Litigation Reform Bill to Improve Access to Justice for American
Consumers (Feb. 10, 2017), http://goodlatte.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?
DocumentID=809 [https://perma.cc/WPA7-FQP7].
17. Perry Cooper, Bill Targeting Class Actions, MDLs Sent to House, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.bna.com/bill-targeting-class-n57982083903/ [https://perma.cc/
3FGD-S66R] (noting that an “earlier version” of the bill “stalled in the Senate”).
18. H.R. REP. NO. 115-25, at 3 (2017).
19. Richard Marcus, Revolution v. Evolution in Class Action Reform, 96 N.C. L. REV. 903,
939 (2018) (“It is uncertain whether this proposed legislation will ultimately be adopted.”).
20. See infra Part II.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (2012).
22. Lawyers for Civil Justice describes itself as “a partnership of leading corporate
counsel and defense bar practitioners . . . . [Which] unit[es] the business and defense bar
communities in propelling reasonable reform initiatives.” See About Us, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, http://www.lfcj.com/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/Y9NF-YWC9] (last visited
Aug. 24, 2018).
23. Gluck, supra note 12.
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power at their disposal to broker a global settlement.24 In their view, this
unbalanced procedure results in plaintiffs bringing meritless MDL claims
and forces defendants into settlements to make them go away and satisfy the
judge.25 Determining whether any of this is true demands rigorous empirical
analysis—analysis one hopes will be undertaken dispassionately before any
changes are made.
In the meantime though, it is worth remembering what Professor Burbank
taught long ago: procedure is about power, when it comes both to who writes
the rules and what they say.26 And the fight over MDL, both past and present,
is a striking example of this battle for power.
My goal in this Article is to situate the looming battle for control over
MDL within its historical context. MDL was, from the beginning, a power
grab, albeit a well-intentioned one, by judges who believed that concentrated
national judicial power was necessary to meet the demands of a coming
“litigation explosion” in the federal courts.27 These judges thought that
control over managing these cases needed to be taken out of the hands of
both individual litigants,28 particularly well-resourced corporate defendants
who benefited from delays, backlogs, and complexity,29 and passive judges
inclined to allow the parties to decide the pace of their cases.30 They believed
what was urgently necessary was a statute that gave judges control over
nationwide litigation and enabled them to aggressively move cases to a
conclusion, thereby preventing the federal courts from breaking down under
the coming wave of litigation and ensuring that the law would be enforced.31
Although initial proposals for the MDL statute envisioned Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for MDL cases, the judges who supported the initiative
came to believe that participation by rule makers would unduly delay
implementation of the statute and that rigid rules would interfere with the
flexibility necessary to manage the coming deluge of complex cases.32 They
also recognized that the corporate-defense bar, which had effectively blocked
the statute’s passage in Congress in 1966, opposed MDL because its
effectiveness at enforcing the substantive law would work to the detriment
of their clients who benefited from delays and resource advantages.33
Accordingly, the MDL statute was intentionally designed to avoid
24. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, REQUEST FOR RULE MAKING TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 3 (2017), http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/1/1/2/0/112061707/
lcj_request_for_rulemaking_concerning_mdl_cases_8-10-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7P5UNQWR].
25. Id.
26. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 513 (1996).
27. Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 907 n.528 (2017).
28. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 3.
29. Id.
30. Bradt, supra note 27, at 841–42.
31. Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class
Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV 1711, 1713 (2017).
32. Id. at 1732–33.
33. Id.
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rulemaking and to ignore the objections of the defense bar. The locus of
control of MDL would be the newly created JPML with the transferee judges
handpicked to manage the consolidated pretrial proceedings.34
Part of what makes the current legislative proposals—which are almost
entirely driven by the corporate-defense bar—interesting is that they threaten
this central, and very intentional, locus of control. Externally imposed
procedures for MDL cases, whether mandated by Congress or the Rules
Committee, would undermine one of the crucial goals of the drafters of the
statute, who believed that flexibility for individual judges was necessary to
adapt to the endless variety of complicated cases that face the federal
courts.35 Instead of a one-size-fits-all structure, judges wanted to manage
litigation on a case-by-case basis to demonstrate that the federal courts could
in fact handle the coming wave of litigation, and thereby enforce the laws
they had been charged with effectuating. Rather than rules imposed by other
parties, the judges who created MDL wanted independence for the JPML and
transferee judges—independence that could be guided by the suggestions
described in the original Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation,
which was primarily drafted by Judge William Becker of Kansas City, the
same judge who spearheaded the effort to create the MDL statute.36 The
Manual, like other judicial guides to handling complex cases before it, was
intended to provide a nonbinding set of suggestions judges might consider
when presented with multidistrict cases.37 It was to be the Manual that would
guide MDL practice—not strict procedures imposed from without.38 Today,
the drive to create MDL “rules” threatens these basic features of the MDL
framework, and the battle lines look just like they did in the 1960s.
My goal in this Article is not to argue that this history binds either the
Rules Committee under the Rules Enabling Act or Congress, which is
ultimately in charge of federal procedure.39 Nor is it to defend the practices
of the judges who used their influence to push the MDL statute over the
congressional finish line in 1968. Instead, my intent is to shed light on the
reasons the statute was constructed as it was and suggest that those engaged
in the current debate ask, after becoming informed by available data, whether
those reasons have lost any of their currency. I also offer some tenuous
predictions about the path forward, recognizing that the prediction business
34. See generally Bradt, supra note 15.
35. See infra Part I.
36. See In Memoriam: Judge William H. Becker, 807 F. Supp. LXIX, LXXII (W.D. Mo.
1992) (“[I]t was Judge Becker’s pen that really was reflected in the first draft of the manual.”);
see also Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 294
n.26 (2013) (“The motor force behind the drafting of the Manual was the leadership of William
H. Becker.”).
37. Bradt, supra note 27, at 853.
38. See Pub. L. No. 90-296, 92 Stat. 1407 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (2012)) (granting wide discretion to transferee judges in MDLs).
39. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1678 (2004) (noting that Congress “holds the cards” when it
comes to federal procedure).
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is a dangerous one in the current political climate. First, I review the history
to explain why the MDL framework was built without Rules Committee
involvement. Then, I fast-forward to the present day and discuss briefly the
nascent proposals to either amend the MDL statute or provide for Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for MDL. Finally, I conclude by assessing the
current debate and make some suggestions as this debate winds its way
forward. In 1968, the small cadre of judges who developed and fought for
the MDL statute won the battle for procedural power. Today, fifty years
later, the MDL statute continues to operate as they imagined. However, with
success comes scrutiny, and what had been settled is now once again up for
debate.
I. CONTROL OVER MDL: THE 1960S STORY
The MDL statute was passed without a single dissenting vote in 1968—
but that fact risks obscuring the real story. The MDL statute was enormously
controversial, both among federal judges and the practicing bar, particularly
the corporate-defense bar.40 That it became law at all was due largely to the
maneuvering and lobbying of a small group of federal judges, led by Circuit
Judge Alfred Murrah and District Judge William Becker.41 In addition, the
efforts of Maryland Senator Joseph Tydings, who chaired the Senate
Judiciary Committee, were critical.42 I have outlined the story of the MDL
statute in detail elsewhere.43 Here, I focus on aspects of that story relevant
to our subject—where control over MDL rests.
The MDL statute arose out of the massive and unprecedented litigation
that followed revelations of price-fixing in the electrical-equipment industry
in the 1950s.44 A deluge of civil litigation began across the country, and in
1962 Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed a committee of federal judges, the
Coordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation (CCML), to consider ways
of streamlining the litigation to avoid grinding the business of the federal
courts to a halt.45 Warren did not choose the judges on the committee
randomly; they were selected because they were longtime proponents of
then-novel principles of case management in complex litigation.46 The
dominant norm in federal judging had been a hands-off approach—these
judges, and in particular Judge Murrah, were men who believed that judges
needed to take rigid control of cases, actively manage discovery and motion
practice, and even promote settlement.47 Given the massive influx of
40. See Bradt, supra note 27, at 838–40.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 854–63.
45. Id. at 855–56.
46. Id. at 851–59.
47. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1983 (1989) (describing the “major development” of
the 1950s when judges began to “see themselves . . . more as managers of a costly and
complicated process”).
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electrical-equipment antitrust cases, some 1900 of them, each of which
would have been a complicated “big case” individually, Chief Justice Warren
believed nationwide managerial innovation was necessary and that these
were the judges to develop it.48
The CCML began an aggressive campaign of organized discovery, pretrial
conferences, and uniform orders.49 But the Committee had no statutory
mandate. Instead, it relied on the cooperation of all of the judges to whom
the cases had been assigned around the country to stick with the program.
Happily, due in large part to the magnitude of the electrical-equipment
litigation crisis, the program was successful on its terms, and the cases were
almost entirely resolved by 1966.50 It was during this period that the CCML,
with the support of Chief Justice Warren and the Judicial Conference, turned
toward creating a permanent statutory mechanism for coordinating related
cases filed in multiple districts.51 These judges believed that such cases of
nationwide import would become increasingly common as technology and
communications brought the country together, the population grew, and new
causes of action proliferated.52 The electrical-equipment cases were just the
tip of the iceberg.53
Coordinating cases in a single district for pretrial proceedings followed by
remand for trial was the brainchild of the Secretary for the CCML, Professor
Phil C. Neal of the University of Chicago Law School.54 This idea of
“limited transfer” was the hallmark of the MDL statute from the beginning.55
But in its initial phases, the plan was for the MDL statute to enable the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to develop Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to determine when an MDL should be created, where it should be
assigned, and what rules should govern it after transfer. Indeed, this was the
plan as late June 1964.56 As Judge Becker described the draft statute to his
colleagues on the CCML, “‘the rule making power [should] be employed to
the maximum’ [to] ‘allow greater flexibility for amendment and supplement
of the procedures.’”57
But in this respect the CCML changed course soon thereafter. The judges
decided that, instead of delegating power to the Rules Committee, the power
to decide whether to create an MDL should be lodged in a new and
independent committee of judges, the JPML, and they abandoned entirely the
idea that there should be special rules of procedure for MDL cases.58 Why
the change in course? First, the CCML had observed the difficult and
48. See Bradt, supra note 27, at 854–56.
49. Id. at 856–58.
50. Id. at 859–60.
51. Id. at 863–64.
52. Id. at 889–90.
53. See id. at 863–66.
54. Id. at 864–65.
55. Id. at 839.
56. Id. at 871–72.
57. Id. at 870. The underlying archival research is discussed in-depth in my Article. See
generally id.
58. Id. at 881.
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protracted fight in the Rules Committee over the amended joinder rules,
including new Rule 23.59 The CCML, fearing an imminent litigation
explosion, did not want to wait out a lengthy Rules Committee process before
getting MDL started, particularly if such a process would work a change in
their vision.60 Second, and relatedly, to avoid the Rules Committee’s
involvement in an area it likely considered its jurisdiction, Judge Becker
would have to take the MDL proposal “straight to the top” of the Judicial
Conference to secure its support for the MDL statute in Congress.61 To do
so, Becker and Murrah would have to get the blessing of Chief Judge Alfred
Maris of the Third Circuit, who was the powerful chairman of the Committee
on Revision of the Laws and whose support was necessary to influence the
congressional judiciary committees.62 Judge Maris, helpfully it turned out,
generally supported the MDL idea of limited transfer for pretrial
proceedings, but he was deeply skeptical of the idea of Federal Rules for the
conduct of MDL.63 Maris believed that these cases would come in all shapes
and sizes and was leery of any rules that assumed all cases should all be
conducted in a particular way.64
By late 1965, the CCML concurred with Maris and adopted his insight on
the importance of case-by-case flexibility. Moreover, they all agreed that
there need not be Rules Committee involvement—both to avoid
entanglements and delays, but also to avoid retarding innovation in
overseeing complex cases of nationwide importance.65 The decision was
thus made to cut the rule makers out of the process entirely and instead lodge
power over MDL in the new JPML, which would autonomously decide
whether and where to establish MDLs, create rules for its own conduct, and
be almost entirely insulated from appellate review.66 Maris agreed with this
course of action and endorsed the revised MDL statute in the Judicial
Conference, which agreed to support the statute in Congress.67
Judicial Conference support was a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the MDL statute’s enactment.68 The Judicial Conference had significant
influence in Congress in the 1960s, but such influence was not enough on its
own in the face of other obstacles, namely the opposition of the corporatedefense bar led by particularly powerful New York antitrust lawyers who
believed that they had been steamrolled into settlement in the electrical-

59. Bradt, supra note 15 (manuscript at 2).
60. See Bradt, supra note 27, at 873 (“Becker thought it important that the group sidestep
the lengthy process of presenting its draft for revisions by the Civil Rules Committee, which
could take years and would also leave their statute vulnerable to revision by other judges.”).
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 879–80.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 878–82.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 881–83.
68. See PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 301–
06 (1973) (describing the power of the Judicial Conference in Congress in the 1960s).
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equipment cases.69 In language that would seem quite familiar today, those
lawyers complained bitterly that the focus on speed and resolution in the
electrical cases effectively railroaded them into paying out meritless claims.
As Breck McAllister of Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, put it, “it
became very clear that . . . the national program of the Committee would
move forward and ‘nothing’ would interfere with its progress.”70 Lawyer
John Logan O’Donnell added that the speed of discovery eliminated
defendants’ ability “to point out and question specific characteristics of the
cases.”71 And, as lawyer Miles G. Seeley later summarized, defense counsel
believed that “they and their clients were caught up in a torrent of judicial
efficiency over whose tumult they scarcely could make their voices heard.”72
Moreover, those lawyers understood well that aggregation of plaintiffs’
claims would eliminate one of their most potent litigation advantages: the
imbalance of resources. By allowing plaintiffs to pool resources and
coordinate activities, the MDL statute would level the playing field. As
O’Donnell put it bluntly, the aggregation eliminated defendants’ “advantage
of numbers” because “[p]laintiffs pool their resources and generally
designate their most experienced lawyers.”73 He continued, “more
important, each plaintiff is handed a ready-made case to the extent that expert
lead counsel can establish it and, in any event, a far better case than most
plaintiffs’ counsel could ever establish without the coordinated program.”74
For their part, the judges of the CCML, particularly Becker, Murrah, and
Judge Edwin Robson of Chicago, believed that defense counsel were mostly
interested in preserving this resource advantage and, in Robson’s words,
were “trying to do all they c[ould] to block this amendment.”75 Indeed, the
CCML set a meeting with some defense counsel in the electrical cases to
solicit input on the proposed MDL statute. When the lawyers suggested
circulating the provision to a wide group of lawyers for public comment, the
CCML bristled, believing that the lawyers merely sought to delay and
frustrate passage of the statute, or at least dominate the drafting process.76
As Robson wrote to Becker, “It is apparent that defendants wish to kick the
ball around.”77 Becker’s skepticism was equally strong:
Underlying the action of some of the defendants’ counsel throughout this
litigation must have been the hope that this electrical equipment antitrust
litigation would overwhelm the Courts and demonstrate the unworkability
of the antitrust laws allowing treble damage recoveries in civil suits. Every
69. See Bradt, supra note 27, at 888.
70. Breck P. McAllister, Judicial Administration of Multiple-District Treble Damage
Administration, in 1966 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 55, 60 (N.Y. State Bar Ass’n ed., 1966).
71. John Logan O’Donnell, Pretrial Discovery in Multiple Litigation from the
Defendants’ Standpoint, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 133, 137 (1966).
72. Miles G. Seeley, Procedures for Coordinated Multi-District Litigation: A Nineteenth
Century Mind Views with Alarm, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 91, 93 (1969).
73. O’Donnell, supra note 71, at 138–39.
74. Id. at 139.
75. Bradt, supra note 27, at 876.
76. Id. at 876.
77. Id.
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measure proposed which would make multiple civil antitrust litigation
manageable, impairs that hope.78

Ultimately, the judges pushing the MDL statute concluded that defense
counsel were little more than rent seekers, out to preserve their advantages in
costs and delays while also undermining the courts as a vehicle for private
enforcement of the substantive law. The result was that the judges abandoned
their attempt to receive feedback from defense counsel and pressed ahead
without their support.79
This was a disastrous legislative strategy. The defense lawyers that the
CCML had rebuffed controlled the powerful antitrust section of the
American Bar Association (ABA). Those lawyers generated a resolution
from both the antitrust section and then the entire House of Delegates of the
ABA at its annual meeting in 1966 and did so without notice to either the
plaintiff-side members of the antitrust section or the judges supporting the
MDL bill.80 As Judge Robson accurately described things, “the cards were
stacked against us by the defendants.”81 Without ABA support, and with the
opposition of powerful New York attorneys connected to House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Emmanuel Celler, the MDL bill was stuck—and it
would remain so until the ABA dropped its opposition.82 Even in the Senate,
where the MDL bill was getting traction—thanks largely to the interest of
Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland, who was especially interested in
efficient judicial administration—prominent members of the corporatedefense bar railed against the bill. They offered amendments, such as a
predominance requirement, that Becker believed were intended to cripple the
effectiveness of the statute.83 Becker successfully beat back those
amendments in the Senate, but the ABA resolution continued to block the
bill in the House until early 1968.84
What broke the logjam? Face-to-face politics. A corollary to the CCML’s
eventual view that there need not be Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
MDL was the idea that innovation in complex litigation would be better
developed through a set of nonbinding guidelines in a handbook that would
be open to revision.85 This project, led by Becker, was to be titled Manual
for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation and was already underway when the
MDL statute was stalled (proceeding without input from the defense bar).86
As Professor Miller remembers, corporate defense counsel “were fighting the
manual as it was then drafted tooth and nail” because it appeared to facilitate
78. Id. at 876–77.
79. Id. at 877–78.
80. Id. at 887–89.
81. Id. at 888.
82. See id. at 899–902.
83. See Bradt, supra note 31, at 1731–37.
84. See Bradt, supra note 27, at 899–902.
85. See Andrew J. Simons, The Manual for Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere
Recommendations?, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 493, 496 (1988); Thomas E. Willging, Beyond
Maturity: Mass Tort Case Management in the Manual for Complex Litigation, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 2225, 2228–29 (2000).
86. Bradt, supra note 27, at 903–04.
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the kind of benefits for plaintiffs that the defendants had complained of in
the electrical-equipment cases.87
In 1967, a meeting was held in New York between the judges supporting
the MDL statute and the prominent defense lawyers opposing it.88 At that
meeting, the CCML judges emphasized their need for the lawyers’ support
of the MDL statute.89 Shortly after, the lawyers changed course and
facilitated the ABA’s dropping of its opposition.90 But something else
happened: the defense bar got a seat at the table for the drafting of the
Manual—a story I tell in some detail elsewhere.91 Having reviewed the
available historical record, my hypothesis is that the lawyers, rational actors
and repeat players in the federal courts, saw this as a worthwhile exchange
and dropped their opposition to the statute in exchange for influence on the
Manual. And they exercised that influence, by suggesting an array of
changes that found their way into the finished project.92
Moreover, once the opposition was dropped, the dam broke—the MDL
statute was passed in remarkably short order and was signed by President
Johnson on April 29, 1968.93 Chief Justice Warren appointed the first JPML,
and MDL was off and running.94
II. CONTROL OVER MDL: THE 2018 STORY
Over the intervening five decades, MDL has hummed along with virtually
no legislative or Supreme Court intervention.95 So it came as something of
a surprise when FICALA was proposed in the House in 2017. The surprise
was not that the bill was introduced—that had happened before. But it had,
as its title suggests, historically focused on class actions. But this time, the
bill contained an entirely new set of provisions devoted to amending the
MDL statute, including provisions that imposed rigid procedural rules and
threatened the independence of the MDL transferee judge that was so
important to the drafters of the statute.96 For instance, the statute includes:
(1) a requirement of evidentiary verification of allegations within forty-five
days of filing or transfer; (2) a bar on bellwether trials without consent;
(3) enhanced interlocutory review of most orders issued by the MDL judge;
and (4) a requirement that personal-injury plaintiffs receive “not less than 80
percent of any monetary recovery.”97 The accompanying report from the
87. Id. (quoting In Memoriam: Judge William H. Becker, 807 F. Supp. LXIX, LXXII
(W.D. Mo. 1992)).
88. Bradt, supra note 27, at 899.
89. Id. at 899–900.
90. Id. at 900–01.
91. Id. at 901–07.
92. Id. at 899–907.
93. Id. at 906–07.
94. Id.
95. Bradt, supra note 15 (manuscript at 2). But see Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 (1998) (barring the practice of MDL judges
transferring cases to themselves for trial).
96. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105 (2017).
97. Id.
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House Judiciary Committee makes plain the purposes of these provisions, in
language that could have come from MDL’s opponents in the mid-1960s
(except for the concern trolling on behalf of plaintiffs): “The resulting
massive proceedings, often largely consisting of claims that should never
have been filed, impose unfair burdens on courts and defendants and prevent
plaintiffs with trial-worthy claims from timely getting their day in court.”98
FICALA passed the house on a party-line vote with no amendments and no
hearings.99 As of this writing, the bill remains in the Senate Judiciary
Committee.100
Perhaps only mildly daunted, the proponents of these measures have
opened up a new front for reform: the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.
Three groups made proposals to the Rules Committee for its November 2017
meeting: Lawyers for Civil Justice, Washington Legal Foundation, and the
Duke Center for Judicial Studies represented by John Rabiej.101 The
proposals contain different provisions, but they share two of FICALA’s
foundational principles: that MDL judges need to be constrained, and that
MDL attracts meritless claims that are underexamined before being folded
into a global settlement. Also like FICALA, the proposals share enthusiasm
for requiring early factual support for plaintiffs’ claims, consent for
bellwether trials, and increased interlocutory appeal. But some of the
proposals go further and target other aspects of MDL procedure, such as the
use of master complaints and internal governance of plaintiff steering
committees.102 As articulated in the agenda book for the November meeting,
“the question is whether the time has come to undertake an effort to generate
rules specially adapted to MDL proceedings.”103 The Rules Committee
concluded that a subcommittee should be appointed to
gather more information. Valuable information has been provided, but it is
mostly from one perspective . . . . But the Committee needs more,
particularly from the Judicial Panel [on Multidistrict Litigation]. The
Committee should launch a six- to twelve-month project to gather
information that will support a decision whether to embark on generating
new rules.
A Subcommittee will be appointed to develop this
information.104

98. H.R. REP. NO. 115-25, at 3 (2017).
99. The House Report notes that hearings had been held on an earlier version of the bill
in 2015, but that version did not contain any of the provisions amending the MDL statute. Id.
at 6.
100. The Senate held hearings on November 8, 2017, but there has not been activity since
then.
101. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, U.S. CTS., at 469–76 (Nov. 7, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
2017-11-CivilRulesAgendaBook_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y2Q-PWDZ].
102. See, e.g., id. at 469–72.
103. Id. at 477.
104. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Agenda: Meeting of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, U.S. CTS., at 92–93 (Apr. 10, 2018), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
2018-04-civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7NU-PFED].
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This Subcommittee issued a report for the April 10, 2018, meeting of the
Rules Committee, though it emphasized that “it has reached no conclusions
about whether any rule changes should be seriously considered, much less
which ones. The range of issues is very broad, and forming a sufficient
information base for serious consideration of rule amendments . . . will be
challenging.”105 Thus far, the plaintiffs’ bar, at least as preliminarily
represented by the American Association for Justice, has expressed “deep
reservations” about any MDL rules, largely on the ground that “MDLs are so
case-specific that ‘one size fits all’ rules do not make sense. Judges need to
remain empowered to exercise broad discretion in any particular case rather
than be constrained by formalistic preconceptions of what a vocal minority
consider to be ‘best practices.’”106 For its part, the JPML apparently has
reported to the Subcommittee “skepticism about whether rule changes would
materially improve MDL practice.”107 It has further reported that “[p]anel
members are open to work on shared concerns, but may be inclined to think
that distinctive aspects of different MDLs make some overarching set of new
rules hard to imagine.”108 At least at these early stages, the battle lines are
drawn; well-funded corporate defense groups in favor of rules want to limit
discretion of MDL judges, while the plaintiffs’ bar and JPML are copacetic
with the status quo.
III. LOOKING AHEAD, WHILE ALSO LOOKING BACK
Whether any of these efforts will be successful is impossible to know at
this early stage. The legislative effort appears stalled in the Senate, and the
results of the November 2018 midterm elections may press the pause button
for the foreseeable future. On the rulemaking side, the Subcommittee will
be embarking on a lengthy period of study and reaching out to concerned
parties and collecting data, as it of course should. And if past is prologue,
changes coming through the rulemaking process are likely to be relatively
modest and mirror changes in class actions that were, in Richard Marcus’s
apt terms, “evolutionary” rather than “revolutionary.”109 But even
evolutionary changes can be significant and important. Consider, for
instance, the effects of the interlocutory appeal provision for class

105. Id. at 147; see also id. at 153 (noting that the Committee’s “inquiry is at a very early
stage”).
106. Id. at 205 (appending a 2018 memorandum from the American Association of
Justice’s MDL Working Group to the Subcommittee).
107. Id. at 158.
108. Id.
109. Marcus, supra note 19, at 917 (“In terms of potentially revolutionary change, the first
two experiences with amending Rule 23 produced an evolution away from revolution that has
continued through the most recent episode.”); see also David Freeman Engstrom, Jacobins at
Justice: The (Failed) Class Action Revolution of 1978 and the Puzzle of American Procedural
Political Economy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1531, 1560 (2017) (noting that “[m]any scholars have
decried the increasingly narrow ken of the Advisory Committee and its growing instinct for
the capillary, not the jugular, in revising civil procedure rules”).
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certification in Rule 23(f).110 Similarly, any of the current MDL proposals
in FICALA could work a major change in the dynamics of MDL practice.111
Nevertheless, as Professors Burbank and Farhang have taught us, major
change through legislation is extraordinarily difficult and through modern
rulemaking only somewhat less so. The status quo is “sticky,” particularly
when codified by a statute or rule.112 As a structural matter, “the institutional
hurdles were simply too high” for conservatives to eliminate the legislationand rule-based infrastructure of the twentieth-century procedural system.113
As a result, procedural retrenchment was achieved through decisions made
by an increasingly polarized and conservative Supreme Court, not
legislation.114 And, as I have written elsewhere, the drafters of the MDL
statute designed it to be especially sticky by vesting power and maximal
discretion in the hands of the JPML and its preferred transferee judges.115
That MDL has eluded significant interference for the last fifty years is a
testament to stickiness generally and the deftness with which Becker and his
allies designed their creation. Indeed, what they saw to fruition in 1968 was
built to last. The creators of the MDL statute were not modest about their
work—at the time, they saw it as a “radical proposal,” one which would
become a centerpiece of a federal procedural system which would come to
be dominated by large-scale, nationwide, and, indeed, mass-tort litigation.
That MDL has been such a success, warts and all, demonstrates amply their
prescience.116
Increasing the odds against a new suite of federal rules for MDL is the fact
that, as a practical matter, it would be an extraordinarily complicated
endeavor. Simply collecting the necessary reliable data on MDL is a difficult
and resource-intensive task.117 And although the current momentum for
110. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution
Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1515 (2017) (noting how Rule 23(f)
“seemed modest at the time [but] facilitated major changes in class action jurisprudence
through court decisions” and demonstrated that “even in the domain of rulemaking, some
consequential reforms can fly under the radar screen”); Miller, supra note 36, at 322
(describing how interlocutory appeal under 23(f) “imposes significant additional cost and
delay”).
111. Indeed, both FICALA and the rulemaking proposals seek increased opportunities for
interlocutory appeal of decisions by the MDL transferee judge.
112. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation
Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1560 (2015) (describing the
“stickiness of the status quo”).
113. STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 218–19 (2017).
114. Id.
115. See generally Bradt, supra note 15.
116. Bradt, supra note 31, at 1716 (describing how the “drafters thought [MDL] a ‘radical’
addition to the federal procedural toolbox”); Bradt, supra note 27, at 841 (arguing that “MDL
is now working essentially as its creators intended”).
117. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, supra note 104, at 89 (noting a committee member’s
view that “‘[w]e have nowhere near the information we would need to have’ to work toward
rules proposals”); Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, supra note 101, at 477 (noting that
rulemaking would be “a formidable undertaking” and that “[a] great deal of information must
be gathered to support useful rulemaking”).
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rulemaking comes primarily from defense interests, opening the door to this
debate will inevitably introduce criticism of how MDL works from other
perspectives, including the plaintiffs’. Such criticism may not come from
prominent members of the MDL plaintiffs’ bar, which tends more often than
not to be the subject of this criticism rather than the source, but from
academics who argue that powerful repeat-player plaintiffs’ attorneys are
part of the problem and not the solution.118 Ultimately, then, having loosened
the lid on Pandora’s Box by studying the possibility of rulemaking for MDL,
this may be the sort of project that the rule makers might shy away from
simply as a matter of prudence.119 Indeed, one of the main reasons why
Judge Murrah and Judge Becker, at Judge Maris’s encouragement, backed
away from rulemaking for MDL in the 1960s was the potential difficulty and
time-consuming nature of the project.120 If nothing else, the repeated
attempts to revise the class action rules, attempts that have resulted in
relatively marginal changes, have demonstrated the difficulty of making
massive changes through the rulemaking process.121 In addition, the
openness of the rulemaking process today compared to the 1960s, due in
large part to the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, has made that
process even more difficult.122
That said, much has changed since the MDL statute was passed in 1968,
and those changes may make it more likely that amendments or new federal
rules will come to fruition. Two examples come to mind. First, the general
climate of private enforcement is far more controversial now than it was five
decades ago.123 As Professor Farhang has demonstrated, in the 1960s
Congress made intentional choices to deploy private attorneys to enforce the
substantive law through litigation.124 And Congress, led in large part by
118. Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
389, 391 (2012). See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict
Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class
Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND.
L. REV. 107 (2010).
119. Richard Marcus, Shoes That Did Not Drop, 46 MICH. J. L. REFORM 637, 637 (2013)
(“[W]hat the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules does not do is, in some ways, as important
as what it does. . . . Amendments do not and should not happen often. Amending the rules is
not easy and should not be.”).
120. Bradt, supra note 27, at 873 (noting that “Judge Becker thought it important that the
group sidestep the lengthy process of presenting its draft for revisions by the Civil Rules
Committee, which could take years and would also leave their statute vulnerable to revision
by other judges”); id. at 881 (describing how cutting the rule makers out of the process would
“retain maximum future flexibility and ensure control by the new Judicial Panel”).
121. Marcus, supra note 19, at 907 (noting that while there have been amendments to Rule
23 that “generated much commentary, nobody really thought them revolutionary”).
122. Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 903–04 (1999).
123. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 110, at 1503 (“It was not until the political and
ideological valence of private enforcement became apparent that questions about democratic
values in rulemaking . . . became obvious and insistent.”).
124. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 4 (2010) (detailing how “the legislative choice
of private litigation over administrative power emerged from conflict between ideologically
antagonistic interests, channeled through America’s fragmented political institutions”).
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Senator Joseph Tydings’s Judiciary Subcommittee on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery and prodded by a legislatively active Judicial
Conference,125 expanded the machinery of the federal courts in order to
efficiently handle the coming litigation.126 The MDL statute was central to
that ethos; indeed, one of the primary goals of the drafters of the statute was
to ensure that the federal courts would be able to face the wave of coming
litigation.127 In short, the solution to the “litigation explosion” the judges
feared was more efficient judicial machinery.128 The ascendancy of this
ethos was, however, short-lived. Not long after the statute was passed,
private enforcement became much more controversial.129 As Burbank and
Farhang show, the goal of political conservatives was to squash litigation,
not facilitate it.130 In retrospect then, the MDL statute may represent the
high-water mark for zeal for procedural innovations to assist private
enforcement.131 Today, even the use of the courts to enforce the substantive
law is a source of major controversy,132 and, as the proposals for revising the
MDL statute illustrate, litigation itself is seen by many as an evil to be
avoided. This view appears to be shared by Chief Justice Roberts and many
of those he has chosen for the Rules Committees.133

125. Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the
Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 288 (2000) (describing the lobbying of
the Judicial Conference since the 1960s).
126. Bradt, supra note 27, at 891 (noting that Tydings was “exceptionally interested in
improving the operations of the federal courts”); see also Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The Federal
Magistrates Act: History and Development, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 565, 567 (describing
Tydings’s interest in judicial administration).
127. Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1165, 1201 (2018) (noting the CCML’s belief that “a permanent mechanism was needed to
handle this influx of litigation”).
128. Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in
Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1270 (2017) (noting how the drafters of the
MDL statute “intended it to be the primary procedural mechanism for resolving the
‘explosion’ of mass-tort litigation they predicted was coming”).
129. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1890 (2008) (describing
the use of the term “litigation explosion” to drive “a broad range of legislative and judicial
reform measures designed to drive plaintiffs from the courts”); A. Benjamin Spencer, The
Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 359 (2010) (describing the
“threshold skepticism that yields an interest in excluding or discouraging claims rather than
supporting and encouraging them”).
130. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 113, at 3 (describing “the conservative legal
movement within the Republican Party . . . to weaken the infrastructure” of private
enforcement).
131. Richard Marcus, Misgivings About American Exceptionalism: Court Access as a
Zero-Sum Game 59 (Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law, Research Paper No. 248, 2017),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3042903 [https://perma.cc/X4M2-89VZ]
(“American procedure hit its liberal high point around 1970 . . . . Since then, the changes that
have occurred have generally been in a direction that could be said to retreat from the broadest
possibilities of open-access procedure.”).
132. Id. at 69 (describing the “fierce debate in the US about whether private litigation is a
good way to regulate industry and protect consumers”).
133. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 113, at 2 (describing the desire to “diminish or
disable the infrastructure for the private enforcement of federal rights”); id. at 33–34, 244
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Second, procedure itself has changed, as has the perception of it, at least
among lawyers and scholars. For one thing, as every reader of this
Symposium surely knows, trial rates continue to drop to infinitesimal
levels.134 As a result, despite the outsized importance of bellwether trials in
MDL cases, there is no denying that all of the action occurs in pretrial
proceedings.135 As a result, the notion that MDL is a mere technical device
to ensure efficiency in discovery can no longer be maintained, though that
was never an accurate description.136 In 1991, Professor Resnik once
referred to the MDL statute as a “sleeper”—she was correct then, but not so
now.137 This attention to MDL fits with the recognition that procedural law
is powerful—both in terms of who writes it and what it says.138 Both the
controversial process and the product of the recent discovery-rules
amendments provide ample evidence that the world has changed.139 So
while history would suggest that major changes to the MDL statute are not
in the offing, perhaps those who are so aggressively pursuing change are
actually striking at exactly the right moment.
Setting current politics aside, one goal of this Article is to suggest that
while much has changed, there are also aspects of the current moment that
closely resemble the mid-1960s. And, indeed, there may be some wisdom to
be gleaned from the experience of the creation of the MDL statute that may
prove useful going forward. For instance, the rule makers may simply
conclude that the insights of Becker, Murrah, and their colleagues in the
1960s continue to persuade today. Those judges understood that rigid rules
would simply not do for a dynamic area of law. They believed that MDLs
would come in many shapes and sizes, and judges would need flexibility in
order to manage them. Strict rules would potentially hamstring judges in
their ability to adapt to changing circumstances, new laws, and different
kinds of litigation. As a result, the judges eschewed rules and chose instead
to collect wisdom in regularly revised versions of the Manual for Complex
Litigation.140
It is difficult to see how, if at all, changes in the last fifty years have
undermined this essential insight. As MDL has grown more prominent,
particularly in the wake of obstacles to mass-tort class actions, numerous
(noting Chief Justice Roberts’s enthusiasm for procedural reform and his early career as a
Reagan administration advocate for legislative retrenchment of private enforcement).
134. Marc Galanter, The Decline of Trials in a Legalizing Society, 51 VALPARAISO U. L.
REV. 559, 565 (2017) (“Now, trials are just a bit more than one percent of civil cases.”).
135. John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE
L.J. 522, 526 (2012) (describing the importance of pretrial procedure in an era of rare trials);
see also Marcus, supra note 131, at 58 (“In place of trial, it is said, litigation has come to focus
on discovery and summary judgment.”).
136. Bradt, supra note 27, at 840–41.
137. See supra note 3.
138. Burbank, supra note 26, at 513 (arguing that the study of procedure is about “power:
who has it and who should have it both in litigation and in making the rules for litigation”).
139. Richard Marcus, How to Steer an Ocean Liner, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 615, 616–
17 (2014) (describing the unprecedented controversy surrounding discovery amendments).
140. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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massive controversies have found their way before transferee judges.
Seemingly every major controversy of national scope, including massive
consumer fraud, products liability, data breaches, and the gargantuan opioid
epidemic, is now the subject of an MDL.141 Although the growth of MDL
as the central mechanism for resolution of complex litigation in the federal
courts is a primary reason it now attracts critical attention after lingering in
the shadows for decades, the massive number of complicated cases that now
find their way into MDL is a reason to retain flexibility rather than freeze
procedure through a set of specific mandates.
It may very well be true that some of the proposals found on the wish list
of reform advocates would be worthwhile in certain kinds of cases. For
instance, at a certain point in products liability MDLs (a point much further
down the road than sixty days), Lone Pine orders and case censuses may well
be justified to ensure that only meritorious claims remain.142 And there
certainly may emerge, after additional experimentation, best practices for
selecting and conducting bellwether trials.143 But whether such practices are
appropriate in a given case should remain within the discretion of the
transferee judge, perhaps guided by a much-needed revision to the Manual
for Complex Litigation or other sets of best practices that may develop over
the coming years. Any such best practices will hopefully, like any study by
the Rules Committee, be informed by empirical data and the real-world
experiences of judges, litigants, and lawyers in MDL.
Indeed, wide participation in such a project is crucial. As outlined above,
such widespread participation was not a hallmark of the creation of the MDL
statute. The small number of plaintiffs’ lawyers that the judges consulted
were happy to be on board because they recognized the potential benefits of
aggregation.144 The defense lawyers, on the other hand, sought at first to
slow the process down and later to amend the statute to make it more defensefriendly. The judges, for their part, viewed these counsel as rent seekers
opposed to both enforcement of the law and the public interest. As a result,
the judges shut them out of the process and impugned their motives. The
lawyers, of course, did not take this lying down and managed to both engineer
an ABA resolution opposing the statute and block it in Congress. It was only
after the judges and lawyers met face-to-face in New York, and the judges
promised the lawyers a seat at the table for the drafting of the Manual, that
the block dissipated and the statute passed.
Half a century later, the parallels are apparent. Once again, the lawyers of
the corporate-defense bar are seeking to amend the MDL statute—and to
dominate the process. From their point of view, the flexibility and
141. Cabraser & Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 876.
142. D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
2175, 2177 (2017); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Comments on the Fairness in Class Action
Litigation Act of 2017, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2017), http://static.reuters.com/resources/media
/editorial/20170213/houseclassaction--burchletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSJ4-3KST].
143. Alexandra D. Lahav, A Primer on Bellwether Trials, 59 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming
2018).
144. Bradt, supra note 27, at 877.
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unpredictability of MDL work against them—just as they thought the preMDL informal aggregation of the electrical-equipment cases did. The
amendments they seek limit the discretion of the MDL judge and increase
oversight. The current proposals, especially FICALA, appear more like an
opening bid for reform from the defense perspective than an evenhanded
rethinking of current policy, and we do not know whether the claims
supporting them stand up to empirical scrutiny. The reforms suggested by
groups like Lawyers for Civil Justice lead only to benefits for corporate
defendants, so while they may open the bidding they should only serve to
start the conversation. Before making sweeping changes to the MDL
process, we must study more closely how MDL works in practice—both in
large and small litigations—and we must ensure that any proposed reforms
are vigorously debated in light of what that study reveals. My own view is
that such debate would be best undertaken as part of a multiyear process of
developing a revised Manual for Complex Litigation, but that is an argument
for another day.
So we end where we began. The push for MDL reform remains about
power and control. Lawyers who perceive themselves as harmed by the
control that the drafters intentionally lodged in the JPML and transferee
judges want to wrest it back by restraining those judges with defense-friendly
rules. As Professors Burbank and Farhang have shown us, such success
through legislation or rulemaking is likely a long shot.145 But their story, of
course, does not end there. The project of retrenchment succeeded in the
U.S. Supreme Court, where rulings are final and five votes are all that is
necessary. While statutes and rules are sticky, the Court is the universal
solvent. By specifically not using the Federal Rules, lodging power in the
JPML, and writing an open-ended statute, there is precious little in the MDL
statute for the Supreme Court to retrench under the guise of interpretation.
But there are nevertheless possibilities for the Court to cut back on MDL’s
applicability. For instance, I have argued that the basis for nationwide
personal jurisdiction in MDL, at least as currently articulated, is surprisingly
weak, though not unconstitutional.146 All told, the MDL statute is relatively
difficult to undermine through interpretation—statutory or constitutional—
but one thing Burbank and Farhang have taught us is that the Supreme Court
is extraordinarily powerful and ideologically polarized when it comes to
private enforcement, so all bets may be off if MDL finds its way into the
Court’s crosshairs.147
CONCLUSION
Despite its growth, prominence, and success, on its fiftieth anniversary the
MDL statute faces a looming battle for control of its future. Legislative and
rule-based proposals abound, though prospects for their success are
uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the corporate-defense bar is eager
145. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 113, at 218–19.
146. Bradt, supra note 127, at 1228.
147. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 113, at 218–19.
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to impose procedural requirements on the operation of MDL cases, in order
to rein in unpredictable and imperialistic judges and limit unmeritorious
claims that flow into the MDL with little scrutiny. If their proposed rules are
adopted, it would mark a major change in the structure of MDL, which was
designed to operate with no one-size-fits-all requirements, much less Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or congressionally mandated strictures. This small
group of federal judges believed that flexibility and independence on the part
of the JPML and MDL transferee judges were necessary to cope with the
onslaught of nationwide litigation headed for the federal courts. Moreover,
the MDL statute’s supporters believed they were acting in opposition to the
members of the corporate-defense bar, whom they thought opposed the
statute in order to both preserve litigation advantages related to costs and
delays for their clients and to frustrate private enforcement of the substantive
law.
These two conclusions by the drafters—that rules would be
counterproductive and that the defense bar was interested more in protecting
their interests than in efficient administration of justice—led the drafters to
design the MDL statute to be both insulated from rule makers and run with
little interference. That is, the locus of control of MDL was placed within
the JPML and their handpicked MDL transferee judges. It is that central
feature of MDL that is now up for grabs. Whether change is coming is
uncertain. At best, statutes are sticky and procedural change tends to be, in
Professor Marcus’s words, evolutionary rather than revolutionary.148 But
much has changed since the 1960s—MDL is having its moment in the
spotlight, and those in favor of change show no signs of letting up. As the
process moves forward, it will be critical to both gather data and query
whether the decisions that the drafters of the statute made a half century ago
still have power. Otherwise, the next fifty years of MDL may wind up
looking very different from the first.

148. See Marcus, supra note 19, at 907–08.

